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The ratio of skill to unskilled labour stocks in the economy is widely acknowledged to 
have an important role for development. Can education policy affect the evolution of this 
ratio? This paper shows that it can, and it also shows that the actual effect of education 
policy depends on the allocation rule of the budget across educational levels. The 
consideration of a stylized hierarchical education model allows us to develop analytical 
conditions under which the allocation rule favours the accumulation of skills. The analysis 
has implication for policy makers in developing countries, where skill formation is much 
needed, because it shows that observed allocation rules usually violate the maximization 
condition by the assignment of higher-than-optimal resources to higher education. 
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Resumen 
La relación entre el stock de trabajo calificado y no calificado en economía es 
reconocidamente un elemento importante para el desarrollo. Puede la política educativa 
afectar la evolución de esta relación? Este articulo muestra que si se puede, y también 
señala que de hecho los efectos de la política educativa dependen de la regla asignación de 
recursos entre niveles educativos. Se trabaja con un modelo jerárquico estilizado que 
permite desarrollar condiciones analíticas que aseguran que la regla de asignación de 
recursos efectivamente favorece la acumulación de capacidades. El análisis tiene 
implicaciones de política para los países en desarrollo , donde la formación de 
calificaciones es altamente necesaria, porque se muestra que las reglas observadas de 
asignación  usualmente violan la condición de maximización por asignar niveles por 
encima del optimo al nivel de educación superior.  
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Even when the links between skills and growth, and hence education and growth, are well 
established on theoretical grounds (mainly in the endogenous growth theory, see for 
instance, Lucas, 1988, and Romer, 1986), the empirical evidence of these links is weak. To 
explain this, several authors (Birdsall et al., 1998; Gemmel, 1996; Papageorgiou, 2003) 
have stressed the importance of the distinction between the different stages of human 
capital creation for development and, therefore, the relevance of considering the internal 
allocation rules of the education budget. 
The skill-to-unskilled stock ratio in developing and developed countries shows significant 
differences. According to UNESCO, the proportion of population with below upper 
secondary as maximum educational attainment of adult population in the OECD country 
members is, on average, 29% (data for 2005), whereas the proportion of lower secondary 
as maximum attainment in developing countries is much higher; for instance, in Brazil, the 
rate is 70.5%, and it is even higher in many African countries, with rates over 90%. 
Explanations to this gap are easy to find, as in developing countries, the accumulation of 
skills is hindered by inefficient education systems, often aggravating funding difficulties. 
For this reason, the system structure matters because the performance at earlier stages 
affects the output at higher levels; the budget allocation rule should take this into account. 
To analyze this point, hierarchical education models have been used by Driskill and 
Horowitz (2002, 2009) and Su (2004). As noted by Su (2004), hierarchical structure in 
educational systems implies that levels are not perfect substitutes, which means that 
different allocation of similar budget size have different effects on aggregate efficiency and 
distribution. This paper discusses the allocation rules of the educational budget in a 
stylized two-level education system characterized by internal inefficiency. Dealing with 
inefficiency optimally will allow the achievement of a maximum ratio of skill to unskilled 
labour, considered the target. The simplicity of the model allows the development of 
analytical conditions under which the allocation rule favours the accumulation of skills and 
allows the development of several clear-cut policy recommendations that may serve as a 
guide to policy makers. 2 
 
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the current situation regarding 
education budget allocation and accumulation of skills. Section 3 presents the education 
model and its properties. In Section 4, the conditions to maximize the stock of skills are 
discussed. The conclusion is presented in Section 5. An Appendix with mathematical 
details also is presented. 
2 The current situation 
The distribution of skills across countries varies considerably, especially between 
developed and developing countries (see Table 1). In developing countries, the majority of 
the population (above a half) has primary education or less as maximum educational 
attainment, whereas in developed countries, the proportion of the population with tertiary 
education is more than one third of the total population, and it is as high as 46% in the case 
of Canada.  
In many developing countries education systems show several weaknesses, especially in 
quality and coverage. In many cases, the expenditure on public education per student is far 
behind that in the developed world, but as argued by Birdsall et al. (1998), Gemmel 
(1996), and Papageorgiou (2003), both the size and the efficiency of the allocation of the 
public funds for education are relevant for the overall systemic performance.  
A hint on allocation rules can be obtained by examining Table 2, which shows that, in 
general, although the government preferences do not differ very much across developing 
and developed countries in terms of the size of the budget (measured by the public 
expenditure on education as % of GDP, shown in the last column of the table), there are 
significant differences in the preference over the budget allocation (measured by the public 
expenditure per pupil as a % of GDP per capita by education level, shown in the first, 
second, and third data columns). As can be seen in Table 2, countries such as US and Japan 
have a perfectly flat allocation pattern (levels “equally preferred”), and in general, 
developed countries have a quite even distribution, with the exception of Korea, which 
allocates less than average to higher education. The situation among developing countries 
is more heterogeneous. For instance, whereas in countries, such as Chile and Argentina, 
the distribution is quite flat, there are many countries that display strong preferences for 
higher education, some of them extraordinary high, such as Mozambique and Botswana 3 
 
 Table 1 Educational attainment of the adult population. Distribution of the population 
aged 25 and older, by highest level of education attained (in percentages) (in percentages). 














Argentina   2004  43.8   14.2   28.4   13.6   
Bangladesh  2001  73.3   9.6   12.9   4.2   
Botswana  2000  75.3   15.7   5.9   3.1   
Brazil  2004  57.5   13.0   21.2   8.1   
Chile  2004  24.0   26.0   36.9   13.2   
Costa Rica  2007  50.9   13.8   18.5   15.0   
India   2000  77.7   12.4   6.5   3.3   
Kuwait*  2006  55.2   19.2   17.2   8.3   
Mauritius*  2000  60.5   18.6   17.6   2.6   
Mozambique  2000  96.9   2.3   0.8   0.1   
Nigeria  2000  97.1   1.8   0.7   0.4   
Uganda  2002  88.5   5.1   1.6   4.8   
Uruguay  2006  52.8   22.4   15.1   9.6   
Australia  2005  9.1   25.8   33.3   31.5   
Canada  2004/2005  4.9   9.9   39.2   46.1   
Finland* 2006  22.0   8.9   38.8   30.3   
Ireland*  2006  23.7   16.3   31.2   26.4   
Japan 2004/2005        60.1   40.0   
New Zealand   2005     21.3   51.6   27.1   
Republic of Korea  2005/2006  11.9   12.6   43.9   31.6   
United Kingdom  2004/2005     14.4   55.9   29.6   
United States  2005  6.3   8.5   49.0   36.2   
Notes: Last data available. Total may differ from 100% because of missing information or rounding.* Upper 
secondary includes postsecondary nontertiary. 
Source: Own elaboration with data from UNESCO/UIS WEI (www.uis.unesco.org/publications/wei2007); 
UNESCO, Global Education Digest 2009; Barro and Lee data set. 
Considering the data in Tables 1 and 2, the observed differences in educational budget 
allocation rules and systemic performance (measured by the educational attainment of the 
population) lead to the question of the role of budget allocation in skills formation. For 
instance, as noted by Gemmel (1996), there is a key skill level for each development stage: 
human capital effects on growth are most evident at the primary level in low-income 
countries; for higher income developing countries, the key is the secondary level, whereas 
the tertiary level is the most relevant in developed countries. Thus, according to this 
approach, many African countries would be using allocation rules contrary to their 
development needs. In the long term, the disparity between skills endowment between the 4 
 
rich and poor countries is likely to widen, as richer countries are able to invest more money 
to expand and improve their educational services, generating virtuous or vicious circles 
 
Table 2: Public expenditure per pupil as a % of GDP per capita by education level and public expenditure on 
education as % of GDP. 
  




education as % 
of GDP   COUNTRY  Primary  Secondary  Tertiary  All levels 
Argentina 12  19  13  14  4 
Bangladesh 9  15  46  13  2 
Botswana 16  41  450  34 10 
Brazil 14  12  34  15  4 
Chile 12  13  13  13  3 
Costa Rica  17  17  36  19  5 
India 9  17  58  15  3 
Kuwait 12  16  102  22  5 
Mauritius 12  19  37  17  4 
Mozambique 16  69  570  23  5 
Nigeria 31  46  366  34  3 
Uganda 11  32  179  14 5 
Uruguay 8  10  18  11  3 
Australia 17  16  24  18  5 
Finland 18  32  35  28  6 
Ireland 15  22  25  19  5 
Japan 22  22  20  22  4 
New Zealand  19  22  28  22  6 
Republic of 
Korea 18  23  9  17  4 
United Kingdom  20  25  30  24  5 
United States  22  24  24  23  6 
Note: Averages of available years 2004-2006. 
Source: Own elaboration with data from UNESCO data base 
http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/ReportFolders/ReportFolders.aspx 
This article focuses on the role of budget allocation rules on the skill formation process. 
Under this approach, considering a desired target of skill share in labour produce, policy 
makers could allocate resources accordingly. The conditions to do this efficiently will be 
discussed in the rest of the paper. 
3 The education model  
As the learning process is cumulative, the indicator  m f  is defined as  ∑ =
m
j m q f , which is 
the knowledge accumulated per student who has completed up to level m , where  j q  is the 
accumulation at  j . The indicator  m f  measures the human capital accumulated during the 5 
 
schooling process; the  j q  accumulated at different levels are not perfect substitutes, so the 
allocation of resources across them will affect human capital accumulation. 
A two-level education system is considered, consisting of basic and higher education 
( H B j , = ), The output per student is  ( ) j j j k q q = , where  j k  measures the resource 
intensity per student, and  0 > ∂ ∂ j j k q ,  0
2 2 < ∂ ∂ j j k q , it is assumed to measure “school 
quality.” Students leave the system early when the quality of education they receive is 
poor; the output per student is taken as the determinant of early dropouts,  ( ) B q θ θ = , 
where  0 < ∂ ∂ B q θ  and  0
2 2 < ∂ ∂ B q θ . The composition of the inflow of labour produced 
depends on time of exit and on school quality. Thus, the accumulation process is driven by 
B B U f E dL θ =   
H B H H S f E f E dL ) 1 ( θ − = =   
where  θ  is the early exit rate, and  U dL  and  S dL  are the inflow of units of unskilled and 
skilled labour, respectively. The marginal ratio of skilled to unskilled labour produced can 
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The ratio of skilled to unskilled labour in the economy is modified by ξ . When 
U S L L > ξ , where  S L  and  U L  are the stocks of skilled and unskilled labour, respectively, 
the ratio of skilled to unskilled labour in the economy rises; it declines when  U S L L < ξ  
and remains unchanged when growth is balanced 
As the marginal ratio ξ  is dependent on the capital intensity of the basic and high 
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where a hut (^) placed over the variables denotes rate of growth, and S is the survival rate 
defined as  θ − =1 S .  
The evolution of ξ  depends on the effects of allocation on the survival-to-exit rate and on 






















,  ( ) 0 < ∂ ∂ B B H k f f , and 
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4 Properties and implications 
The properties of ξ , the conditions under which  0 > ξ d  and its implications, will be 














Property 1.  0 > ∂ ∂ B k ξ  if  ( ) θ εθ − > 1 H q s
B , where  H H H f q s =  and 
θ θ εθ B B q q q
B ∂ ∂ − = . (See Appendix for Demonstration 1) 
The capital intensity in basic education will have a positive effect on the marginal ratio of 
skilled to unskilled labour if the elasticity of the dropout variable to the quality of basic 
education (
B q θ ε ) is high. So, for a given  H s , if the survival parameter is too low, the  
higher the possibility that the increase in capital intensity in basic education  have a 
positive effect on the marginal ratio ξ . 
Implication1. ξ  is a non monotonic function of  B k . It follows from the demonstration that 
B k ∂ ∂ξ  has an indeterminate sign. 
Implication 2. ξ  is a non monotonic function of K .  

































coupled with that by definition  0 > ∂ ∂ K k j ,  H B j , = , it follows that ξ  is a non 
monotonic function of K . 
Proposition 2. The allocation of more resources to basic education (with fixed budget and 
enrollment) will increase the marginal ratio of skilled to unskilled labour, that is, 





k k k q k q
q s
B h H H B B
B  
where  θ θ εθ B B k k k
B ∂ ∂ − = ,  H B B H k h k k dk dk
B H − = ε  and 
j j j j k q q k k q
j j ∂ ∂ − = ε ,  H B j , = . (See the Appendix for Demonstration 2). 
Implication 3. Considering that  k B k B B = , where  K K B B B = , when  0 > B dk dξ  it also 
holds that  0 > B dB dξ , assuming k  is constant. 8 
 
5 Are there clear-cut policy recommendations? 
For a given budget, it is possible to find a rule to maximize the skill to unskilled ratio of 
labour produced by maximizing  ) , ( H B k k ξ  subject to  H B K K K + =  and technology 
parameters. 








k q k k k q
k S
B B B H H H
B . 
where  θ θ εθ B B k k k
B ∂ ∂ − = ,  H B B H k h k k dk dk
B H − = ε , and 
j j j j k q q k k q
j j ∂ ∂ − = ε ,  H B j , = . The program has no closed solution, but some clear 
hints can be obtained. It can be shown that  
[]
B k B B H H H
B
B q k k k q H
k










Considering also the “quasi-neutral” assumption on education technology that 
j j H H B B k q k q k q ε ε ε = = , the above expression can be written as: 
j j j j B B k q
H
H


















where  K K B H H =  is the participation of higher education in the total budget. 
The determinants of the elasticity of ξ  with respect to the resource intensity in basic 
education can be shown using the above expression. It shows that the elasticity of the 
marginal ratio of skilled to unskilled labour relative to the resource intensity in basic 
education is higher: 
- The higher is 
B k θ ε , the responsiveness of the early exit rate to the resource intensity. 
- The higher is  B s  ( H B s s − =1 ), the contribution of basic education in total human capital 
accumulated. 9 
 
- The lower is  B B  ( H B B B − =1 ), the participation of basic education in the total budget. 
The level of the early exit rate (θ ) has an ambiguous role. The former aspect listed is a 
pure technology parameter, the latter is a pure policy variable; the second value listed is a 
combination of technology and policy aspects. Note that the education technology plays a 
crucial role. For instance, in an extreme case, 
B k θ ε  could be zero, in which case, the effect 
on ξ  of an increase in  B k  would be negative. 
These results imply that in many developing countries with bad systemic outcomes due to 
the poor performance of basic education, the increase in the share of resources to basic 
education ( K K B B B = ) could be more effective in terms of increasing the amount of skill 
labour in relation to unskilled. 
6 Conclusions 
The ratio of skill to unskilled labour stocks in the economy is widely acknowledged to 
have an important role for development. Can education policy affect the evolution of this 
ratio? This paper shows that it can, and it also shows that the actual effect of education 
policy depends on the allocation rule of the budget across educational levels.  
The skilled-to-unskilled ratio of the inflow of labour created depends on the internal 
efficiency of the education sector. The cumulative nature of the education process leads to 
asymmetries between educational levels, particularly in presence of systemic inefficiency. 
This is so because school failure at the basic level leaves the few entrants to higher 
education with high output per student: few highly qualified graduates. The consideration 
of a stylized hierarchical education model allows us to develop analytical conditions under 
which the allocation rule favours the accumulation of skills.  
The analysis has implication for policy makers in developing countries, where skill 
formation is much needed, as it shows that observed allocation rules usually violate the 
maximization condition by the assignment of higher than optimal resources to higher 
education. A further implication is that, as long as the marginal skill-to-unskilled ratio 
regulates the wage gap, a less-than-maximum value would worsen the wage distribution. 10 
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The educational budget constraint is: 
H B K K K + =  
By definition  ( ) H B k k k θ − + = 1 , where  B E K k = . Thus, 
[]
2 ) 1 ( ) ( 1 θ θ − − − − − = B B H dk k k dk    (A.1) 
Also, after some manipulation, the above expression can be written as: 












     (A.2) 
where  θ θ εθ B B k k k
B ∂ ∂ − =  and  H B B H k h k k dk dk
B H − = ε  
Demonstration 1 




























































      ( A . 5 )  12 
 
While the sign of  0 > ∂ ∂ H k ξ , that for  B k ∂ ∂ξ  is indeterminate. The conditions under 
which  0 > ∂ ∂ B k ξ are easy to find. Considering the following definitions,  H H H f q S =  
and  θ θ θ θ εθ B B B q q q q
B
' − = ∂ ∂ − = , and substituting in Equation A.3 after some 






ξ () θ εθ − > 1 H q S
B . 
Demonstration 2  
Inserting in A.1, A.4, and A.5 in A.3, using A.2 and the definitions  θ θ εθ B B k k k
B ∂ ∂ − =  
and  θ θ εθ H H k k k








k q k k k q
k S
B B B H H H
B . 
It also can be shown that  
[]
B k B B H H H
B
B q k k k q H
k










Inserting A.2 in the above expression, and defining K K B H H = , and considering the 
“quasi-neutral” assumption that
j j H H B B k q k q k q ε ε ε = = , the following is obtained: 
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S ε θ ε
θ
ε
ε
θ
ξ − −
−
= 1
1
. 